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Eastwood: Constitutional Law: Investigatory Stops and the "Reasonable Perso

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INVESTIGATORY STOPS AND

THE "REASONABLE PERSON"* **
Floridav. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991)
Respondent, a passenger on a bus, was arrested and charged with
drug trafficking when police found cocaine in respondent's bag., Two
uniformed officers, one of whom was visibly armed, boarded the bus
on which respondent was a passenger, approached respondent, and
while standing in the aisle requested his identification and ticket. 2 The
officers had no articulable suspicion that respondent was trafficking
drugs.2 After advising respondent of their objective as narcotics
agents, the officers asked respondent for permission to search his
bags 4 and found the contraband.5 At trial respondent moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it was obtained as part of an
unreasonable search and seizure. 6 The trial court denied the motion,

*Editor'sNote: This case comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case Comment
Award for Fall 1991.
**Dedicated to my parents, Bill and Mazelle Eastwood.
1. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (1991). The search occurred as part of a drug
interdiction effort, in which officers routinely boarded buses during layovers and asked passengers for identification and permission to search their bags. Id. at 2384-85.
2. Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321, 322 (4th DCA 1987) (Letts, J., dissenting in part),
quashed, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989), rev'd sub. nom Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
3. Id. (Letts, J., dissenting in part).
4. Id. (Letts, J., dissenting in part).
5. Id. (Letts, J., dissenting in part). Whether respondent consented to the search and
whether the officers advised respondent of his right to refuse consent was disputed at trial. Id.
(Letts, J., dissenting in part). The trial judge, however, resolved the question in favor of the
state. Id. (Letts, J., dissenting in part). A search conducted after an officer receives a valid
consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
222 (1973). For consent to operate as a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, it must be given
voluntarily. Id. at 248. The Court has made clear that law enforcement officials are not required
to advise persons of their Fourth Amendment rights before consent may be deemed voluntary.
Id. at 231-33; see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)
(finding that the consensual nature of the response is not diminished by the failure to tell the
person of any ability not to respond). The scope of this comment, however, does not include an
analysis of the consent issue in the instant case.
6. Bostick, 510 So. 2d at 322 (Letts, J., dissenting in part).
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and the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, but certified
a question to the Florida Supreme Court for a determination of
whether the officers' investigatory practices were permissible.7 The
Florida Supreme Court determined that because a reasonable passenger in respondent's position would not have felt free to leave the
bus, the officers had impermissibly seized respondent in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. 8 Concluding that the contraband was
therefore unlawfully obtained, the court quashed the district court's
opinion.9 The United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD,
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 10 the
proper test for determining whether a seizure has occurred is whether
a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter with
the police."1
To ensure the protection of the individual's fundamental privacy
rights, the Founding Fathers instituted the Fourth Amendment requirement that searches and seizures be supported by probable cause. 12
The earliest interpretations of the Fourth Amendment stressed the
necessity for a strict reading of the probable cause requirement to
prevent unchecked governmental discretion and to guard the individual's fundamental rights. 13 Over the years, however, as the Court

7. Id. at 321-22 (Letts, J., dissenting in part).
8. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157-58 (Fla. 1989).
9. Id. at 1158.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment reads in relevant part, "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause .. " Id.
11. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389. The Court also held that the Florida Supreme Court erred
in adopting a per se rule as to suspicionless drug sweeps of buses. Id. The certified question
as presented to the Florida Supreme Court read: "May the police without articulable suspicion
board a bus and ask at random for and receive consent to search a passenger's luggage where
they advise the passenger that he has the right to refuse consent to search"? Bostick, 510 So.
2d at 322 (Letts, J., dissenting in part). The certified question as restated by the Florida
Supreme Court read: "Does an impermissible seizure result when police mount a drug search
on buses during schedule stops and question boarded passengers without articulable reasons for
doing so, thereby obtaining consent to search the passenger's luggage"? Bostick, 554 So. 2d at
1154. Whether or not by answering the certified question in the affirmative the Florida Supreme
Court adopted a per se rule as to drug interdiction efforts on buses was a point contested
between the majority and dissent in the instant case. See Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2385, 2392.
The dissent reasoned that the Florida Supreme Court never "intended its phrasing of the
certified question to trump its opinion's careful treatment of the facts in this case." Id. at 2392
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
12. See Michael J. Flannery, Note, Abridged Too Far:Anticipatorj Search Warrants and
the Fourth Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 785-88 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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grappled with the vast range of encounters occurring between law
enforcement officials and citizens, it began to make exceptions to the
probable cause requirement. 14 The Court began to recognize that some
encounters between officers and citizens justified a relaxation of the
probable cause standard. 15 The investigatory stop was one such encounter.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the Fourth
Amendment implications of investigatory stops in the context of a
"stop and frisk" procedure. In Terry v. Ohio,'6 the Court confronted
for the first time the broad issue of whether an encounter that falls
short of a full arrest between a police officer and a citizen requires
some objective justification before it may be judged permissible. 17 In
Terry, a police officer approached petitioner and two companions after
observing conduct he believed characteristic of planning a store robbery.'s The officer identified himself and asked the three men for their
names. 9 When they gave the officer an inaudible response, he forcibly
turned petitioner around and frisked him. 20 After finding a revolver
on petitioner and on one of his companions, the officer arrested the
21
two men and charged them with possession of concealed weapons.
In upholding petitioner's conviction, the Court enunciated a twopart analysis for determining the constitutionality of investigatory
stops.2 First, a court must ascertain whether an actual seizure has
occurred.23 A police officer has seized a person if he restrains the
person's liberty either "by means of physical force or show of authority.' 24 If a court finds that a seizure has occurred, the second part of

14.

See generally Flannery, supra note 12, at 794-96 (discussing the "good faith" exception

to the exclusionary rule).
15. See id. at 791-94.
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. See id. at 9-10.
18. Id. at 5-7. The observed behavior consisted of an "elaborately casual and oft-repeated
reconnaissance" of a store window by two of the men, and the subsequent conferral with the
third man a short distance from the store. Id. at 6. The suspicious behavior continued for
approximately fifteen minutes before the officer approached the individuals involved. Id. The

officer suspected the men were "casing a job, a stick-up." Id.
19. Id. at 6-7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 16, 19.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 19 n.16. The Court noted that not every encounter between a police officer and
a citizen will amount to a seizure, and that the record in this case did not provide enough

information to make the determination of whether petitioner was seized prior to the frisk. Id.
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the analysis requires the officer to articulate a reasonable suspicion
for detaining the individual.In order to attain a balance between governmental interests and
the individual's privacy rights, the Terry two-part test provided some
degree of police discretion while not unreasonably encroaching on the
citizen's Fourth Amendment rights. 26 Applying this analysis to the
facts in Terry, the Court concluded that once the officer frisked
petitioner, a seizure unquestionably took place. - The seizure, however,
was justified by the officer's objective observations concerning
petitioner's suspicious behavior.
Eleven years later, in Brown v. Texas, 29 the Court addressed the
question of whether detaining an individual to demand identification
constitutes a seizure requiring Fourth Amendment protection.3" Two
police officers observed appellant and another man walking away from
each other in an alley, seemingly parting because of the presence of
the patrol car.3 1 Driving into the alley, the officers asked appellant to
identify himself and explain his presence in the alley.2 Appellant refused to cooperate, and the officers arrested him.25. Id. at 19. Only reasonable searches will be upheld. See id. The reasonableness of the
officer's actions should be assessed according to the information available to the officer at the
"moment" of the seizure. Id. at 21-22. Any evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable
seizure will be suppressed at trial. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence
obtained in an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 12; see also Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (excluding evidence that was discovered as a result of an illegal entry
or search). The Terry Court considered the exclusionary rule to be "the only effective deterrent
to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of words."' Terry, 392 U.S.
at 12 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). The Terry Court also noted: "Courts
which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the
constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such
invasions." Id. at 13.
26. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 (commenting that the government's interest in law enforcement must be weighed against an individual's right to be free from unreasonable governmental
interference).
27. Id. at 19.
28. Id. at 30.
29. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
30. Id. at 48. It would have been particularly helpful for the analysis of the instant case
if the Brown Court had explicitly decided that appellant was seized as soon as the officers
requested his identification. However, the Brown Court did not clearly determine at what point
a seizure had been made. Later courts interpreted the Brown decision to stand for the proposition
that an individual may decline an officer's request without fearing detention or prosecution. See,
e.g., Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
31. Brown, 443 U.S. at 48.
32. Id. at 48-49.
33. Id. at 49. Appellant was arrested pursuant to a Texas statute requiring citizens to
identify themselves when lawfully detained by a police officer. Id.
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Reversing the conviction, the Court held that the detention in the
alley constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.3 Adhering to the meaning of a seizure as defined in
Terry, the Court reasoned that because the officers restrained appellant's freedom to walk away, the officers seized appellant.m Moreover,
the officers were unable to articulate a reasonable suspicion for stopping appellant, and therefore the seizure could not be objectively justified. 1 Marking a zenith in the Court's vigilant review of investigatory
stops, 37 Brown'affirmed that the Terry analysis would still guard the
individual's privacy rights even in situations in which the traditional
probable cause requirement was relaxed.
Five years later, however, the Court modified the Terry analysis
by adopting a "free to leave" standard for evaluating investigatory
stops.3 In Immigration & NaturalizationService v. Delgado,3 9 the
Court considered whether immigration officials' entry into factories
for the purpose of surveying employees regarding their citizenship
constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. 40 Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) officials visited the factories without42
warning4 and systematically questioned employees as they worked.
Some officials positioned themselves at the factories' exits, 4 3 and all

the officials wore badges, had weapons, and carried walkie-talkies. 44
The Court reasoned that unless an encounter becomes so intimidating that a reasonable person would not feel "free to leave" without

34. Id. at 50.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 52.
37. Tracey Maclin, Note, Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The FourthAmendment on
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1328 (1990). The author comments:
Brown v. Texas was reminiscent of an earlier judicial era. It recognized that rights
of personal security and locomotion are not waived because one appears suspicious.
Brown made clear that "the balance between public interest [in law enforcement]
and [one's] right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from
police interference."
Id. at 1329 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 52).
38. The "free to leave" standard was first enunciated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980), but a majority of the Court did not adopt it until Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), was decided.
39. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 210.
40. Id. at 212.
41. Id. The officials had valid search warrants to allow the factory visits. Id. The visits
were, however, unexpected by the factory employees. Id. at 217.
42. Id. at 212.
43. Id.
44. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

responding, the Fourth Amendment will not be implicated. 45 Honest
answers or no responses at all to the officials' questions should not
have led the reasonable person to fear detention.46 The factory employees, the Court noted, were free to move about the factory and continue
working during the investigation.47 If an employee had wished to leave
the factory, the Court surmised that the individual would not have
been prevented from exiting by the officials at the exits.- Concluding
that the officials' presence by the exits should have resulted in no
reasonable apprehension that the employees would be restrained from
9
leaving, the Court held that the work force was not seized.4
Finding the instant case to be "analytically indistinguishable" from
Delgado,50 the instant Court held that the proper inquiry in determining whether an individual has been seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is not whether the individual felt "free to leave."'
Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether, taking into account all
the circumstances, the individual felt free to terminate the encounter
with officials.5 2 Reasoning that the Florida Supreme Court's application
of the "free to leave" standard resulted in an overemphasis on only
one characteristic of the encounter, the setting, the Court concluded
that the Florida court overlooked the real substance of the inquiry.Although respondent might have been forced to forfeit his bus ticket
by exiting the bus during the layover, the Court surmised that respondent's choice of transportation, not the officers' presence, dictated
whether respondent felt free to leave the bus.- Thus, the Court revised
45. Id. at 215-16.
46. Id. at 218.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 219.
49. Id.
50. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In regard to the Delgado analysis, one article provides an interesting analogy
pertinent to the instant Court's reasoning. The analogy reads:
Under Delgado's "blame the victim" approach, there would presumably be no seizure if police officers questioned subway passengers on a train that was momentarily
stopped at a station while other officers positioned themselves in front of the train's
doors. Using Justice Rehnquist's analysis, it can be argued that the riders in a
subway are inherently restricted in their movements, not by the actions of the
police officers, but by their choice of travel. If the subway riders had wanted true
freedom from restraint, they should have walked or driven automobiles.
Maclin, supra note 37, at 1305. The similarity of the subway analogy to the instant case highlights
the unusual reasoning of the instant Court and of the Delgado Court, which both found that
the individuals being questioned had restricted themselves.
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the "free to leave" test, changing the emphasis from only the setting
to the totality of the circumstances.By revising the "free to leave" standard, however, the instant
Court made no significant contribution to the analysis which the
Florida court could use to reexamine the case on remand. Although
the instant Court declared that the Florida Supreme Court had instituted a per se rule as to the constitutionality of drug interdiction
procedures on buses, 56 the Florida court had announced and applied

a totality of the circumstances standard.5 7 By instructing the Florida
court to reconsider whether the totality of the circumstances indicated
a seizure, the instant Court implied that the Florida court's weighing
of the pertinent factors was flawed and implicitly suggested that following Delgado would have led to the proper result.
The key, however, to the result reached in Delgado was not a
more accurate or correct weighing of the factors, but instead, a perspective implicit in the Court's reasonable person standard. In deter-

mining that the reasonable person would have known that honest
answers to the INS officials' questions would not have resulted in
further detention, 9 the Delgado Court tacitly assumed that the person
questioned was innocent.6° Further, the Delgado reasonable person,

55. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389.
56. Id. at 2385. The majority of the instant Court insisted that the Florida Supreme Court
adopted a per se rule as to drug interdiction efforts on buses by answering in the affirmative
the certified question, which specified a bus setting. Id. The Florida Supreme Court, however,
considered more than the setting but rather looked at the totality of the circumstances. Bostick,
554 So. 2d at 1157. The dissent in the instant case noted that the Florida court's careful analysis
followed the proper standard, and the wording of the certified question should not be read to
negate the holding of the opinion. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157. The Florida Supreme Court noted the following circumstances in making its determination: the officers wore uniforms, one officer blocked the
aisle, one officer carried a weapon, and the setting was the confinement of a bus. Id. The
restrictive setting was perhaps the most persuasive factor the court considered, but it was not
singularly dispositive. See id. The threatening presence of several officers and the display of a
weapon are two factors that the Court previously enumerated as circumstances which might
indicate a seizure. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
58. See Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387 (comparing instant facts to those in Delgado, 466 U.S.
at 210).
59. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
60. See id. Clearly, illegal aliens would not have believed that honest answers would result
in no further detention, particularly since the officials were arresting suspected illegal aliens on
the spot. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); see also Maclin, supra note 37, at 1308-10
(discussing the Court's "police-oriented, innocent citizen" perspective underlying its Fourth
Amendment analysis).
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who is expected to refuse an officer's requests if unwilling to answer,
is fully aware of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from arbi61
trary, suspicionless inquiries by the government.
In the instant case, respondent, from the standpoint of a reasonable
person, was presumed to be well-acquainted with his constitutional
right to terminate the encounter with the police.62 In its comparison
to Delgado, the instant court implied that regardless of the officers'
raid jackets, one officer's visible weapon, and the confined setting,
respondent was not seized because he could have exercised his right
to ignore the officers at any moment in the encounter. 3 Like the
factory workers in Delgado, respondent could have turned down the
officer's requests and freed himself of the situation at his own will.6
This analysis leaves one wondering what show of authority would
be sufficient to relieve an individual from the burden of saving himself
from governmental intrusion. The Terry analysis intended to put the
burden on the government to justify intrusions under a vigorous judicial review,6 but the instant Court's approach, by attributing a high
degree of fortitude to the reasonable person, reverses those roles.Y
Rather than guarding the individual's right to be free from governmental intrusion, the instant Court's analysis forces citizens to "challenge"
67
the police to preserve their own Fourth Amendment rights.

61. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218 (declaring that respondents had no reason to fear detention
if they simply refused to answer officials' questions).
62. See Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387 (noting that a person may decline an officer's requests
without fearing prosecution). The implication is that the individual is aware of his Fourth
Amendment right to decline the officers' requests. However, an officer is under no obligation
to inform individuals of their right to refuse to cooperate. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 231 (1973). The only source of such information would thus have to be the individual's
prior awareness of his Fourth Amendment rights.
63. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387-88.
64. Id.
65. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968). The Terry Court also expressed that judicial
exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was necessary to preserve
the "imperative of judicial integrity." Id. at 12 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960)). Without vigorous review of evidence procured by unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Court reasoned that it would be "legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence."
Id. at 13.
66. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218-19 (noting that the official's conduct in the factories would
not have led the reasonable person to believe that he would be detained if he refused to answer
the questions). The Delgado Court conceded that most citizens will respond to police questions
but considered it irrelevant to the "free to leave" test. See id. at 216.
67. But see Maclin, supra note 37, at 1306 (commenting that citizens in a free society should
not be forced to challenge police authority to assert their Fourth Amendment rights).
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In presupposing an "innocent" reasonable person, 68 the instant

Court further jeopardized Fourth Amendment protections. Presumably basing the standard on the supposition that the innocent person
will not be bothered by simple inquiries from law enforcement officials,
the instant Court relied on assumptions that have no relation to an
analysis of the Fourth Amendment. 69 The Fourth Amendment addresses not whether an individual will be agitated or embarrassed, but
whether the confrontation restricts the individual's liberty and freedom
of movement. 70 Furthermore, the assumption that innocent persons
Will not be agitated or embarrassed by a confrontation with a police
officer cannot be founded in fact. 71 Even a person with the clearest
conscience may feel disturbed or flustered by unexpected questions
from uniformed officials. 72
Almost two decades before Delgado, the Terry Court contemplated
no such reasonable person perspective." According to the Terry
analysis, any time one has been detained by force or show of authority,
that person has been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 74
Unlike the instant case and Delgado, neither Terry nor Brown made
any mention, either directly or indirectly, of the innocence or guilt of
the individual asserting Fourth Amendment protections, or of the
individual's acquaintance with tenets of constitutional law.75
The Terry Court anticipated a system of active judicial review of
police discretion and insisted that "inarticulate hunches" would not be
a basis for intrusions on the individual's privacy. 76 Delgado, however,
narrowed the Terry definition of a seizure by injecting its reasonable
person standard into the evaluation. 77 Without a determination that a
seizure has occurred, a court is left powerless to require an objective
justification for the intrusion. By aligning itself with the perspective

68. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388.
69. See Maclin, supra note 37, at 1309 (noting that the inconvenience or embarrassment
associated with arbitrary police questioning is irrelevant to the determination of whether a
seizure has occurred).
70. See id.
71. See id. (commenting on the range of emotions an innocent individual may experience
as a result of an ungrounded police encounter).
72. See id.
73. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25 (describing the individual's privacy interests in regard to
a search for weapons without addressing the individual's innocence or of the individual's awareness of his Fourth Amendment rights).
74. Id. at 19 n.16.
75. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51; Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
76. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215.
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in Delgado, the instant Court downplays the magnitude of a potential
intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights during an investigatory stop.
Thus, this approach decreases the likelihood that an encounter will be
deemed a seizure, and so denies the opportunity for judicial review
of the police conduct. In essence, the instant Court's continued espousal of the standard established in Delgado furnishes a grant of discretion to officers in the field, who, since Brown was unanimously
decided, have witnessed an erosion of Fourth Amendment objectivity
requirements.
The Court's approach to examining the Fourth Amendment implications of investigatory stops changed dramatically in the past two
decades. Unfortunately, the trend has reflected a willingness to forfeit
constitutional protections to benefit the effectiveness of law enforcement practices. The instant decision furthers a continuing erosion of
Fourth Amendment protections and calls into question the Court's
commitment to individual liberties. The Court's position brings to mind
a nineteenth-century opinion, in which the Court declared that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing.., by slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure."78 The descent down the
slippery slope envisioned in that opinion began when the Terry Court
relaxed the probable cause requirement for investigatory stops, 79 and
contrary to the Terry Court's intentions, continued as subsequent
decisions weakened even the articulable suspicion requirement. The
Court in the instant case indicates no intention to stop the descent
down the slippery slope, and instead quickens the descent of Fourth
Amendment protections.
Marla Eastwood

78.
79.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
See Teny, 392 U.S. a: 26-27.
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